Negative and Positive Freedom

Abstract

This paper challenges the view that we may usefully distinguish between two kinds or concepts of political and social freedom –negative and positive. The argument is not that one of these is the only, the 'truest', or the 'most worthwhile' freedom, but rather that the distinction between them has never been made sufficiently clear, is based in part upon a serious confusion, and has drawn attention away from precisely what needs examining if the difference separating philosophers, ideologies, and social movements concerned with freedom are to be understood. The corrective advised is to regard freedom as always one and the same triadic relation, but recognize that various contending parties disagree with each other in what they understand to be the ranges of the term variables. To view the matter in this way is to release oneself from a prevalent but unrewarding concentration on 'kinds' of freedom, and to turn attention toward the truly important issues in this area of social and political philosophy.